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ABSTRACT
In the third of his Logical Investigations, Husserl draws an important distinction between two
kinds of parts: the dependent parts like the redness of a visual datum or the squareness of a
given picture, and the independent parts like the head of a horse or a brick in a wall. On his
view, the distinction is to be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion, the notion of
foundation. This paper is an attempt at clarifying that notion. Such attempts have already been
undertaken (separately) by Peter Simons and Kit Fine, and the paper also contains elements of
comparison of our three sets of views.
This paper is about Husserl’s approach to ontological dependence in the third
of his Logical Investigations.1 The third investigation is chiefly concerned with
the distinction between two kinds of parts: the dependent parts or “moments”
or “tropes” or “particularized properties”, like the redness of a visual datum
or the squareness of a given picture (both taken as peculiar to the correspon-
ding object), and the independent parts or “pieces”, like the head of a horse
or a brick in a wall. It is Husserl’s view that the distinction is to be understood
in terms of the more fundamental notion of foundation, a form of ontological
dependence.
Section 14 is central to the third investigation. In this section, foundation
is explicitly defined, and six theorems about wholes, parts and foundation are
stated and given informal justification. The short section 14 constitutes a
sketch of the beginnings of a formal theory of wholes and parts – one of the
different “formal ontologies” Husserl considered important to set up (§24).
This is why in the present paper I shall focus especially on this section.
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Section 14, as well as the rest of the third investigation, is tainted with many
imprecisions and ambiguities which sometimes affect the proper understand-
ing of what Husserl wants to say. The aim of this paper is basically to clarify
section 14, to determine what Husserl is trying to say there and, where neces-
sary, to make some corrections which, I think, preserve the core of Husserl’s
thought. In the last part of the paper, though, I shall argue that Husserl’s ap-
proach to foundation is flawed and subsequently present a sketch of my fa-
vorite approach to foundation.
The clarification of Husserl’s thought on foundation and dependence is a
job which has already been undertaken in Simons 1982, and then in Fine 1995.
Yet both works, though very insightful, contain certain inadequacies I shall
pinpoint in due course.
1. Foundation
At the beginning of section 14, Husserl characterizes two notions of founda-
tion, which I shall call, following Fine’s terminology, species foundation and
objectual foundation. Species foundation is a binary relation connecting
species, or kinds of objects; and objectual foundation is a binary relation be-
tween objects. Husserl explicitly takes the notion of species foundation to be
more fundamental than that of objectual foundation: the latter is to be under-
stood in terms of the former.
Several problems arise when reading Husserl’s characterizations. One is that
it is not clear how to make precise sense of Husserl’s characterization of species
foundation. Another problem is that, regardless of how that characterization is
understood, Husserl’s characterization of objectual foundation does not appro-
priately capture the notion he has in mind – or so it seems to me. As far as I
can see, in order to get an adequate account of objectual foundation in terms of
species foundation in more or less the way Husserl recommends, Husserl’s char-
acterization of the latter notion has to be emended in some way. In the first part
of the paper I will try to show why, and suggest how this can be done.
1.1. Species Foundation
Let us start with species foundation. At the beginning of section 14, Husserl says:
If a law of essence means that an A cannot as such exist except in a more compre-
hensive unity which connects it with an M, we say that an A as such requires foun-
dation by an M or also that an A as such needs to be supplemented by an M.
On the face of this definition, a first question arises: What precisely is the
definiendum? There are two options. The first is that it is a two-place relational
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predicate expressing a binary relation between species – the relation a species
A bears to a species M iff a law of essence means that an A cannot as such exist
except in a more comprehensive unity which connects it with an M. The sec-
ond option is that it is a three-place relational predicate expressing a ternary
relation between an object, a species the object belongs to, and another species
– the relation which holds between an object x, a species A and a species M
iff a law of essence means that x as an A cannot exist except in a more com-
prehensive unity which connects it with an M. Later parts of section 14 offer
quite clear evidence that Husserl intended to define a binary relation between
species.
What is that relation? The first thing to do is to get clear about what Husserl
understands by ‘law of essence’, and this is by no means obvious. As far as I
can see, Husserl uses ‘law of essence’ and ‘synthetic a priori law’ inter-
changeably. He characterizes these laws in terms of the notion of a material
concept and of the notion of analytic necessity. Material concepts (e.g. “House,
Tree, Color, Tone, Space, Sensation, Feeling etc.”) are those which “express
genuine content”, and are opposed to formal concepts (e.g. “Something, One,
Object, Quality, Relation, Association, Plurality, Number, Order, Ordinal
Number, Whole, Part, Magnitude etc.”) which do not (§11). An analytic ne-
cessity is a specification of an analytic law (§12). An analytic law is a true “un-
conditionally universal” proposition which is “free from all explicit or implicit
assertions of individual existence”, and which involves only formal concepts
(§12). A specification of an analytic law is a “special case” of that law which
involves material concepts and / or reference to particular objects; for instance
‘if something is so-and-so, then so-and-so-ness pertains to that thing’ is an an-
alytic law, and ‘if this house is red, then redness pertains to this house’ is a
specification thereof (§12). Finally, a synthetic a priori law is an a priori law
– i.e., as far as I understand Husserl, a true “unconditionally universal” propo-
sition which is “free from all explicit or implicit assertions of individual exis-
tence” – which involves material concepts and which is not analytically nec-
essary (§12). As I previously emphasized, Husserl seems to use ‘law of
essence’ and ‘synthetic a priori law’ interchangeably. Husserl would have a
good motive for that: for him, an essence is a species or genus or differentia
under which an object may fall, and the material concepts are those which cor-
respond to essences (§11).2
2 Some material concepts correspond to accidental “species” (e.g. RED OBJECT), i.e.
species which some objects instantiate but could exist without instantiating them. Thus, it
seems, Husserl uses ‘essence’ in a very broad sense here.
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Not all of this is perfectly clear, but these explications will be enough for
our purposes. How are we, then, to understand Husserl’s definition of species
foundation? One option is to construe its definiens as follows:
(1) It is a law of essence that every member of A is in a more compre-
hensive unity which connects it with a member of M.
But it is not clear that this is what Husserl wanted to say. Parallel to the dis-
tinction between analytic laws and analytic necessities stands the distinction
between laws of essence (i.e. synthetic a priori laws) and necessities of essence
(i.e. synthetic a priori necessities): necessities of essence are specifications of
laws of essence (§12). Now why not construe Husserl’s definiens as:
(2) It is a necessity of essence that every member of A is in a more com-
prehensive unity which connects it with a member of M
rather than as (1)? Arguably, (1) entails (2) – this may be derived from
Husserl’s characterization of necessities of essence on the assumption that a
law of essence counts as a (degenerate) specification of itself. But of course
the converse does not hold. Some clues from the text (see e.g. §7, and what
appears to be an alternative characterization of species foundation in §21)
suggest that (2) should be preferred to (1). Beside exegetical matters, any-
way, it is quite reasonable to prefer (2). Yet, it seems to me, we are still not
at home.
Laws of essence are propositions which involve material concepts, con-
cepts which correspond to essences. It is then quite natural to think that any
such law is “rooted in”, in the sense of “holding in virtue of ”, certain essences
as opposed to other essences. For instance, one may argue that the proposition
that whatever belongs to the species MAN belongs to the species ANIMAL – a
law of essence, or let us suppose so – is true in virtue of what it is be a mem-
ber of the species MAN (i.e. in virtue of what it is to be a man), but not in virtue
of what it is be a member of the species ANIMAL (i.e. in virtue of what it is to
be an animal). Similarly, of course, one may think that any necessity of essence
is in the same sense “rooted in” certain essences as opposed to other essences,
inheriting the sources from the law of essence of which it is a specification.3
There is some evidence that Husserl thinks of laws of essence and necessities
of essence in this way (see e.g. §7).
Under that conception, there are two ways of expressing necessity of
essence, depending on whether the sources are mentioned or not. Reference to
3 Of course, one may hold similar views about analytic laws and analytic necessities.
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sources may be achieved by means of indexed sentential operators of type ‘it
is true in virtue of what it is to be an A, and of what it is to be a B, and … that’
(‘ A, B,...’, for short). Under that policy, which I shall follow in this paper, ne-
cessity of essence simpliciter may be defined by de–relativization: ‘it is a ne-
cessity of essence that p’ can be defined by ‘∃A,B…  A, B,...p’.
(2) involves necessity of essence simpliciter. But my view is that Husserl’s
definiens is better rendered by making reference to sources, as follows:
(3) It is true in virtue of what it is to be a member of A that every such
member is in a more comprehensive unity which connects it with a
member of M.
That is to say, species A is founded upon species M iff the proposition that
every member of A is in a more comprehensive unity which connects it with
a member of M is a necessity of essence having its source in the species A.
That (3) is closer to Husserl’s thought than (2) shows up – or so one may think
– e.g. in §21, where Husserl proposes what he seems to take to be an alterna-
tive characterization of species foundation, and in §7, where he gives another
characterization of that notion. One might even think that the very character-
ization in §14 suggests that reading.
Let us use ‘A M’ for Husserl’s definiendum ‘an A as such needs to be sup-
plemented by an M’ – i.e. in our terms, for ‘species A is founded upon species
M’,4 ‘ε’ for species membership, and ‘zUxy’ for ‘x is in the more comprehen-
sive unity z which connects it with y’. My proposal is thus to render Husserl’s
characterization of species foundation as follows:
(SF1) A M ≡  A ∀x (xεΜ ⊃ ∃ y,z (yεM ∧ zUxy))
(A is founded upon M iff it is true in virtue of what it is to be an A that
every A is in a more comprehensive unity which connects it with an M).
One important question about (SF1) which needs to be settled is, of course,
how the predicate ‘U’ is to be understood.
‘zUxy’ holds when x is in a more comprehensive unity z which connects it
with y. What does this mean? Obviously, that z is a unity which contains both
x and y. Now (at least) two questions arise: (i) How is containment to be un-
derstood here? (ii) Can x and y coincide or, more generally, what are supposed
to be their mereological relationships?
Husserl works with quite a wide notion of parthood: a part is anything which
is “present” in an object, so that a head may be a part of a body and a color –
4 Here and below, I use Simons’ symbolism for the various foundational relations.
5
moment may be a part of a visual datum (§2). This being said, when in the pres-
ent context Husserl talks of a unity containing two objects, must we understand
containment as proper containment, i.e. must we exclude coincidence as a case
of containment? The phrase ‘x is in a more comprehensive unity which connects
it with y’ suggests that proper parthood is at work here, and as Simons argues
(pp. 124–125), this is probably the correct way of understanding the phrase.
As to the second point, it seems that Husserl typically has in mind cases
where neither of the two objects is a proper part of the other, and where they
do not coincide either. This is also an assumption made by Simons (p. 125).
Thus my suggestion is to analyze ‘U’ according to the following equivalence:
(U) zUxy ≡ x < z ∧ y < z ∧ + x ≤ y ∧ + y ≤ x,
where ‘<’ is for proper parthood and ‘≤’ for parthood. But whether the sugges-
tion is acceptable in all details will not be of crucial importance in the sequel.
1.2. Objectual Foundation, and Some Problems
Immediately after having defined species foundation, Husserl goes on to char-
acterize objectual foundation. Here is what he says:
If accordingly A0, M0 are determinate instances of the pure kinds A or M, actualized
in a single whole, and standing in the relations mentioned, we say that A0 is founded
upon M0.
The obvious way of rendering Husserl’s characterization is the following
(‘x y’ is used for ‘object x is founded upon object y’):
(IF1) x  y ≡ ∃A,M (xεA ∧ yεM ∧ A  M ∧ ∃z zUxy)
(x is founded upon y iff x is a member of a species A and y a member
of a species M which are such that A is founded upon M, and x is in
a more comprehensive unity which connects it with y).
But there is a problem here: the characterization certainly does not capture
Husserl’s concept of objectual foundation.
For assume unrestricted composition, i.e. the principle that every collec-
tion of objects make up a further object, their sum or fusion. Then by the pro-
posed definition, for an object to be founded upon another object it is suffi-
cient that (i) neither be a part of the other, and (ii) there be a species A and a
species M such that the first object belongs to A and the second to M, and A
is founded upon M. But this is surely not something Husserl would accept.
Husserl takes the species COLOR (of a visual datum) to be founded upon the
species EXTENSION (of a visual datum) (§16). By unrestricted composition and
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the proposed definition of objectual foundation, any color-moment is founded
upon any extension-moment whatsoever. Husserl would agree that any color-
moment is founded upon some extension-moment belonging to the same vi-
sual datum, but he surely would deny that some color-moments are founded
upon extension-moments belonging to wholly distinct visual data.
At this point, one may reply that when Husserl talks of objects connected
into more comprehensive unities, he has in mind genuine unities, not mere
mereological sums of scattered objects like the sum of the color-moment of a
visual datum and the extension-moment of another visual datum. This may be
the case. But the problem remains. For consider a visual datum consisting of
a colored triangle, with one red side r and two blue sides b1 and b2. Presum-
ably, the triangle is a genuine unity. Husserl would take the color-moment c
corresponding to r to be founded upon the extension-moment e corresponding
to r, but neither upon the extension-moment e1 corresponding to b1 nor to the
extension-moment e2 corresponding to b2. Yet on the assumption that the
species COLOR is founded upon the species EXTENSION, and by the proposed
definition of objectual foundation, c is founded upon both e1 and e2.
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I have just argued that the proposed characterization of objectual founda-
tion does not capture Husserl’s conception of objectual foundation, and I did
this by arguing that the characterization predicts results which are incorrect by
Husserl’s lights. But the problem is even deeper. Husserl thinks of objectual
foundation as follows: an object x is founded upon an object y iff y satisfies a
certain need which x has by virtue of its belonging to a certain species, namely
the need to be supplemented by an object belonging to a given species-more
formally, iff there are two species A and M such that (i) x belongs to A, (ii) A
is founded upon M, and (iii) y satisfies x’s need for an M. Characterization (IF1)
results from that view by specifying what it is for y to satisfy x’s need for an M:
the proposal is that y be a member of M and that x and y be together included
in some more comprehensive unity. That proposal is incorrect given Husserl
views, as the previous examples show: according to Husserl, it is not the case
that c’s need to be supplemented by an extension – moment is satisfied by any
extension moment whatsoever, nor is it true that it is satisfied by e1 or by e2.
1.3. Alternative Characterizations
In order to get things right, I suggest a modification of both the characteriza-
tion of species foundation and the characterization of objectual foundation.
The modification is in two steps.
5 That example was suggested to me by Fine.
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First, I suggest that if a species A is founded upon a species M, and if an
object x is a member of A, then for an object y to satisfy x’s need to be sup-
plemented by an M it is not enough that y be an M included with x in some
more comprehensive unity; y must be an M included with x in some more com-
prehensive unity of a specific kind – that kind being determined by the species
A. The suggestion, as applied to the COLOR /EXTENSION example, is that for an
object to satisfy a given color-moment’s need to be supplemented by an ex-
tension-moment, the object must be an extension-moment which is connected
with the color-moment in a single visual datum.
More formally, instead of starting with a notion of species foundation as a
binary relation, we start with a ternary relation: species foundation is rela-
tivized so that the kind of more comprehensive unity which is needed is ex-
plicitly mentioned. Our basic notion is thus not that of the members of a
species needing to be supplemented by members of another species within
more comprehensive unities; but rather the notion of the members of a species
needing to be supplemented by members of another species within more com-
prehensive unities of a certain species. We put accordingly:
(SF2) AB M ≡  A∀x (xεA ⊃ ∃y,z (yεM ∧ zεB ∧ zUxy))
(A is founded upon M with respect to B iff it is true in virtue of what
it is to be an A that every A is in a more comprehensive unity of type
B which connects it with an M).
Unrelativized species foundation is then naturally defined by existential gen-
eralization upon B, and objectual foundation as follows:
(IF2) x y ≡ ∃A,M,B (xεA ∧ yεM ∧ AB M ∧ ∃z (zεB ∧ zUxy))
(x is founded upon y iff x is a member of a species A and y a member
of a species M which are such that A is founded upon M with respect
to B, and x is in a more comprehensive unity of type B which con-
nects it with y).
Some parts of the third investigation (§7, §10) suggest such moves.
Even though the new approach is superior to the old one, it is still not sat-
isfactory. The triangle example is still problematic. Husserl takes the species
COLOR to be founded upon the species EXTENSION. But with respect to which
species? Presumably, the species VISUAL DATUM. By (IF2) it follows that the
color-moment c corresponding to r is founded not only upon the extension-
moment corresponding to r, but also upon both the extension-moment e1 cor-
responding to b1 and the extension-moment e2 corresponding to b2. But as I
previously stressed, this is an unwanted result.
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In order to get round that difficulty I suggest the following move.6 Let us
define the three – place predicate ‘C’ as follows:
(C1) x CB z ≡df zεB ∧ x < z ∧ ¬∃t (t εB ∧ x < t ∧ t < z).
‘x CB z’ just says that z is a minimal B which contains x, i.e. that it is a B which
contains x, and that there is no strictly smaller B which does the same. Let us
also define the following notion:
(S) x SB y ≡df ∃z (zUxy ∧ x CBz).
One may read ‘x SB y’ as ‘x is B-supplemented by y’. I then propose to re-de-
fine species foundation as follows:
(SF3) AB M ≡  A∀x (xεA ⊃ ∃y (yεM ∧ x SB y))
(A is founded upon M with respect to B iff it is true in virtue of what
it is to be an A that every A is B-supplemented by an M)
and objectual foundation as follows:
(IF3) x y ≡ ∃A,M,B (xεA ∧ yεM ∧ AB M ∧ x SB y)
(x is founded upon y iff x is a member of a species A and y a member
of a species M which are such that A is founded upon M with respect
to B, and x is B-supplemented by y).
It is clear that under this approach the triangle example is no longer problem-
atic. For the side r is a minimal visual datum which contains c, and so by our
definition c is founded upon e. Moreover, r is the only minimal visual datum
containing c. Given that neither e1 nor e2 is part of r, c is not founded upon e1,
and is not founded upon e2 either.
An alternative, natural way of dealing with the triangle problem is to adopt
(IF3) but with a different definition for ‘C’,  namely:
(C2) x CB z ≡df zεB ∧ x < z ∧ ¬∃t (tεB ∧ x < t ∧ ¬ t ≤ z).
‘x CB z’ now says that z is a smallest B which contains x. Two smallest Bs con-
taining something must coincide (i.e. be parts of each other), while two min-
imal Bs containing something need not. Being a smallest B containing some-
thing entails being a minimal B which contains that thing, but the converse
does not hold. Accordingly, objectual foundation defined in terms of smallest
unities is stronger than objectual foundation defined in terms of minimal uni-
6 Something similar was suggested to me by Fine.
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ties. Why choose (C1) instead of (C2)?
I did not manage to find in Husserl’s text evidence in favor of one approach
as opposed or the other. This is prima facie reason to choose the weaker ap-
proach. Another reason is that with respect to some rather plausible meta-
physical views, the weaker approach predicts correct results while the stronger
one does not.
Here is an example involving universals and states of affairs. Let a monadic
state of affairs be a structured entity consisting of a universal and an object,
the first occupying a designated “predicate” position in the structure and the
second a designated “subject” position. Assume a view according to which (i)
something is a proper part of a monadic state of affairs iff it occupies one of
the two positions in the structure, (ii) there are no distinct but coinciding
monadic states of affairs, and (iii) two such states of affairs are identical if they
have the same constituents at the same positions. Suppose now that it is true
in virtue of what it is to be a monadic universal that any such entity enters into
some monadic state of affairs in predicate position (together with some object
exemplifying it). The species MONADIC UNIVERSAL is thus founded upon the
species OBJECT with respect to the species MONADIC STATE OF AFFAIRS. Then take
the universal Redness, two distinct red concrete things a1 and a2, and the state
of affairs s1 of a1’s being red and the state of affairs s2 of a2’s being red. By
(IF3)+(C1), Redness is founded upon both a1 and a2: s1 is a minimal state of
affairs which connects a1 and Redness, and likewise for s2 and a2. And intu-
itively, this is as it should be. But by (IF3)+(C2), Redness is founded upon no
red thing. For take e.g. a1. By the account of objectual foundation, for Red-
ness to be founded upon a1 there must be a monadic state of affairs s such that
(i) s connects Redness and a1, and (ii) s is a part of every state of affairs con-
taining Redness. But there is no such state of affairs. For by (i), s = s1; and s2
contains Redness while s1 is not part of s2 (it is not an improper part since s1
≠ s2, and it is not a proper part since s1 ≠ a1 and s1 ≠ Redness).
The above reconstruction of Husserl’s theory of foundation is the best I
could achieve.
1.4. Simons and Fine on Husserl on Foundation
Let me now compare the views presented in the previous section with Simons
1982 and Fine 1995.
Fine does not address the question of how objectual foundation is to be un-
derstood in terms of species foundation; he simply works with objectual foun-
dation and tries to reconstruct Husserl’s theory in terms of that notion. This is
not a mistake of Fine’s: he does recognize Husserl’s view about which of the
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two notions is prior to the other. Fine just deliberately chooses to deal with
what he takes to be a simpler task – which, as he claims, is still compatible
with the reduction of objectual foundation to species foundation (p. 465).
Yet even if Fine is not mistaken about Husserl’s view, I think he may be so
about objectual foundation. In fact, he suggests that ‘x is individually founded
upon y’ may be understood as ‘y is not a part of x, and it is true in virtue of
the essence of x that x exists only if y does’ (pp. 471 and 473). But it is not
clear that this is faithful to Husserl’s view on these matters. For a consequence
of Fine’s suggestion is that whenever an object is founded upon another ob-
ject, it is (metaphysically) impossible that the former exists and the latter does
not.7 What is not clear to me is whether Husserl thinks that no founded object
can exist without that upon which it is actually founded. If he does not, Fine
is wrong, and if he does, Fine may be right. Independently of Husserl’s view
on these matters, however, one may have good reasons to reject the conse-
quence of Fine’s proposal. Consider once again the view about monadic uni-
versals presented above. On this view, the universal Redness is actually
founded upon every actually existing red thing. But it would be very implau-
sible to say that Redness necessitates all of them.
Simons, unlike Fine, does address the question how objectual foundation
might be defined in terms of species foundation. He proposes a characteriza-
tion of species foundation roughly in the style of (SF1) (p. 125), which is in-
adequate (see below). He then argues that the natural way of characterizing
objectual foundation following Husserl’s suggestion is subject to grave diffi-
culties (pp. 129–130). At this point he gives up and introduces a new founda-
tion relation as a primitive, a four-place relation connecting two objects and
two species – the relation which holds between objects x and y and species A
and M iff “x, qua A, is founded upon y, qua M”. He then analyzes objectual
foundation in terms of this new notion (by existential generalization with re-
spect to species), and finally rests content with giving some axioms govern-
ing the relationships between his new notion of foundation and species foun-
dation (pp. 132–133).
There are three problems with Simons’ approach. The most obvious is that
he does not follow Husserl’s idea according to which objectual foundation is to
be defined in terms of species foundation. The second problem concerns his new
concept of foundation: his new primitive concept of foundation is rather obscure
– in fact, too obscure to be taken as a primitive. Finally, there is a problem with
7 This follows from the common view according to which what is true in virtue of the
nature of something is necessarily true, or at least, necessarily true if the thing exists – a view
which Fine himself endorses (see e.g. Fine 1994, p. 4).
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respect to species foundation. I previously said that he proposes a characteriza-
tion of that notion in roughly the style of (SF1). The qualification ‘roughly’ is
important, for two reasons. First, instead of using an indexed necessity operator,
he uses the operator of necessity of essence simpliciter. I do not take this as a
serious problem, since my preference for an indexed operator is based on an ex-
egesis which I myself take to be subject to criticism. The second point is more
important. Simons’ characterization says that species A is founded upon species
M iff as a matter of (essential) necessity, every member x of A is such that there
is a member y of M such that neither x is part of y nor vice versa (p. 125). In that
characterization no reference is made to more comprehensive unities, while ref-
erence to them is central to Husserl’s conception of species dependence. It can-
not therefore be taken to be a faithful rendering of Husserl’s characterization.
2. The Six Theorems
Let us now turn to the six theorems about wholes, parts and foundation which
Husserl presents in section 14. Before going into the details, it is useful to de-
fine a certain number of notions:
(D1) xB M ≡df ∃A (xεA ∧ AB M)
(x requires to be founded on an M with respect to a unity of type B iffdf
x belongs to a species which is founded upon M with respect to B);
(D2) xM ≡df ∃B xB M
(x requires to be founded on an M iffdf x requires to be founded on an
M with respect to a unity of a certain type);
(D3) x (M,y) ≡df yεM ∧ ∃B (xB M ∧ x SB y)
(x’s requirement to be founded on an M is satisfied by y iffdf y is an
M, and x requires to be founded on an M with respect to a unity of a
certain type B, and x is B-supplemented by y).
Here are three properties of foundation which we shall refer to in the sequel:
1. x y ≡ ∃M x (M,y)
(x is founded upon y iff y satisfies a certain foundational requirement
of x’s);
2. x M ≡ ∃y x (M,y)
(x requires to be founded on an M iff x’s requirement to be founded
on an M is satisfied by something);
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3. x M ⊃ ∃y (yεM ∧ x y)
(x requires to be founded on an M only if x is founded on an M).
The first derives from quantificational logic, and the proofs of the second and
the third make use of the principle that necessities of essence are truths. Let
us now go into the details.
Husserl formulates his first theorem as follows:
If an A as such requires to be founded on an M, every whole having an A, but not an
M, as a part, requires a similar foundation.
The theorem may be naturally expressed by:
THEOREM 1. [A M ∧ ∃x (xεA ∧ x ≤ z) ∧ ¬∃y (yεM ∧ y ≤ z)] ⊃ z M.
I.e. if A is founded upon M, then every whole having an A, but not an M, as a
part, requires to be founded on an M.
Theorem 1 is provably equivalent to the following simpler proposition:
PROPOSITION 1. [x M ∧ x ≤ z ∧ ¬∃y (yεM ∧ y ≤ z)] ⊃ z  M.
I.e. if x requires to be founded on an M, then every whole having x, but no M,
as a part, requires to be founded on an M.
We shall discuss the basis for this theorem in a moment.
Simons’ rendering of theorem 1 is slightly different from mine: he takes
the theorem to state that if species A is founded upon species M, then the
species consisting of the objects containing an A but not an M is founded upon
M (p. 127).8 Simons’ version is stronger than mine, and it is not clear to me
why he proposed it. He claims that theorem 1 follows from the transitivity of
parthood plus basic modal predicate logic. This is true of his version of the
theorem when foundation is understood the way he proposes, but as we saw
in section 1.4, his characterization of foundation cannot be accepted.
Fine’s version of theorem 1 really departs from Husserl’s initial formula-
tion, in part because of Fine’s decision to work with objectual foundation as
the basic notion, but also for other reasons which are opaque to me (see p.
466). Anyway, a comparison with my rendering of the theorem as well as with
Simons’ is for these reasons quite difficult.
8 Here and below, when comparing Simons’ and Fine’s renderings of the six theorems
with mine, I will of course leave aside the fact that their analyses of the corresponding notions
of foundation are different from mine.
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Husserl formulates his second theorem as follows:
A whole which includes a non-independent ‘moment’, without including, as its parts,
the supplement which that ‘moment’ demands, is likewise non-independent, and is
so relatively to every superordinate independent whole in which that non-independ-
ent ‘moment’ is contained,
and claims that it is a corollary of the previous one. In order to formulate the-
orem 2 in a precise way, we need to define the following notions:
(D4) DEPx ≡df ∃y (x y)
(x is dependent iffdf x is founded on something);
(D5) INDEPx ≡df ¬DEPx
(x is independent iffdf x is not dependent);
(D6) DEPxy ≡df ∃z (z ≤ y ∧ x z)
(x is dependent relatively to y iffdf x is founded upon something which
is a part of y).
Theorem 2 is ambiguous between two readings – the generic reading and the
objectual reading:
THEOREM 2.
(1) Generic reading
(a) [x M ∧ x ≤ z ∧ ¬∃y (yεM ∧ y ≤ z)] ⊃ DEPz;
(b) [x M ∧ x ≤ z ∧ ¬∃y (yεM ∧ y ≤ z)] ⊃ ∀t (INDEPt ∧ x ≤ t ⊃
DEPzt).
(2) Objectual reading
(a) (x y ∧ x ≤ z ∧ ¬ y ≤ z) ⊃ DEPz;
(b) (x y ∧ x ≤ z ∧ ¬ y ≤ z) ⊃ ∀t (INDEPt ∧ x ≤ t ⊃ DEPzt).
Theorem 2(1)(a) directly follows from theorem 1. But neither of the other the-
orems follows from the same basis. However, all parts of theorem 2, under any
reading, are consequences of the following nice proposition:
PROPOSITION 2. (x y ∧ x ≤ z ∧ ¬ y ≤ z) ⊃ z y.
I.e. if x is founded upon y, then every whole having x, but not y, as a part, is
founded upon y.
Proof. As we saw, ‘x  M’ entails ‘∃y (yεM ∧ x y)’. Now given this result, it
is clear that 2(1)(a) follows from 2(2)(a) and 2(1)(b) from 2(2)(b). So in order
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to get what we want, it suffices to prove that proposition 2 entails the objec-
tual reading of theorem 2. The first part, i.e. theorem 2(2)(a), immediately fol-
lows from proposition 2 and definition (D4). As to the second part, suppose
that x y ∧ x ≤ z ∧ ¬ y ≤ z. Then by proposition 2, z  y. Let t be any object.
Suppose first that y ≤ t. Then by definition (D6), DEPzt, and so trivially (IN-
DEPt ∧ x ≤ t) ⊃ DEPzt. Suppose now that ¬ y ≤ t. Then by proposition 2 once
again, x ≤ t ⊃ t  y, and so by definition (D5), x ≤ t ⊃ ¬INDEPt. So once again,
(INDEPt ∧ x ≤ t) ⊃ DEPzt.
Unfortunately, theorem 1 cannot be proved on the same basis. But interest-
ingly, both theorem 1 and proposition 2 are consequences of the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION 3. (x (M,y) ∧ x ≤ z ∧ ¬ y ≤ z) ⊃ z  (M,y).
I.e. if x’s requirement to be founded on an M is satisfied by y, then every whole
having x, but not y, as a part, is such that its requirement to be founded on an
M is also satisfied by y.
Proof. Proposition 3 entails theorem 1 because x  M ≡ ∃ y x (M,y), and it
entails proposition 2 in virtue of the fact that x y ≡ ∃M x (M,y).
Simons gives an objectual reading of theorem 2, and claims that it follows from
proposition 3 (p. 144).9 His formulation of the theorem is, however, different
from mine. His reading of the first part of the theorem is roughly the same as
(2)(a). But he is mistaken about the second part, which he renders as follows:
(x y ∧ x ≤ z ∧ ¬ y ≤ z) ⊃ ∀t (y ≤ t ⊃ DEPzt).
Instead of writing ‘x ≤ t’, Simons puts ‘y ≤ t’ and he eliminates the condition
‘INDEPt’. The first move, i.e. the replacement of ‘x’ by ‘y’, is clearly incor-
rect, since, following Husserl’s formulation, it is the ‘moment’ which is sup-
posed to be contained in the superordinate whole, not the object on which the
‘moment’ is founded. The elimination of the independence condition is harm-
less once the above mentioned mistake is made, since, as Simons himself notes,
proposition 3 ensures the truth of the second part of theorem 2 as he under-
stands it.
Fine also gives an objectual reading of theorem 2, and he considers proposi-
9 Simons defines x  (M,y) in terms of his primitive four-place foundation relation, by
existential generalization with respect to the first species-position: x  (M,y) iff there is a species
A such that x, qua A, is founded upon y, qua M.
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tion 2 as a reasonable basis for it (pp. 467–468). His rendering of theorem 2 is al-
most the same as mine. The only difference is that he imposes a further, superflu-
ous condition on the superordinate whole, namely that it contains z as well as x.
In order to formulate the remaining theorems, the following notions need
to be defined:
(D7) DEPPxy ≡df x ≤ y ∧ DEPxy
(x is a dependent part of y iffdf x is a part of y and is dependent rela-
tively to y);
(D8) INDEPPxy ≡df x ≤ y ∧ ¬DEPx
(x is a independent part of y iffdf x is a part of y and is not dependent
relatively to y).
Husserl’s formulation of these theorems is relatively clear. Here are the theorems:
THEOREM 3. INDEPPxy ∧ INDEPPyz ⊃ INDEPPxz.
THEOREM 4. DEPPxy ∧ y ≤ z ⊃ DEPPxz.
THEOREM 5. ∃y DEPxy ⊃ DEPx.
THEOREM 6. INDEPPxz ∧ INDEPPyz ⊃ (¬DEPxy ∧ ¬DEPyx).
Theorem 5 follows from the definitions; theorems 4 and 6 follow from the tran-
sitivity of ‘≤’; finally theorem 3 follows from the transitivity of ‘≤’ and propo-
sition 2. Simons’ and Fine’s renderings of these four theorems are essentially
the same as mine (for Simons see pp. 144–146, and for Fine pp. 468–469).
So all six theorems follow from the transitivity of ‘≤’ and proposition 3.
Thus given that (plausibly) proper parthood as well as parthood in the wide
sense are both transitive, it is not important in which sense ‘≤’ is understood
above. Anyway, choosing the wide sense – as both Simons and Fine do – seems
to be the most natural move and is, I think, quite faithful to Husserl’s inten-
tions. On the other hand, it would be nice to find simple axioms from which
one may derive proposition 3, but I did not succeed in finding such a base.
3. An Alternative, and More Satisfactory Approach to Foundation
With the notion of foundation, Husserl wants to capture a certain idea of on-
tological non-self-sufficiency: a founded object is one which cannot exist
without other definite objects, or without objects of a certain kind.
It seems quite clear that Husserl thinks of foundation in such a way that no
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whole is founded upon any of its parts: if x is founded upon y, then x is in a
more comprehensive unity which connects it with y; and as I have emphasized
in a previous part of this paper, it seems that this latter condition excludes that
y is part of x. Now wholes, or at least some of them, are in a sense ontologi-
cally non-self-sufficient “with respect to their parts”: they cannot exist with-
out their actual parts, or at least without having parts of certain kinds. For in-
stance, one might say, a visual datum must have a color–moment, a person
must have a brain, a quantity of water must contain H2O molecules, etc.
Thus there seems to be a wider notion of foundation – call it, following
Fine’s terminology, weak foundation – which, intuitively, is more basic than
the other notion: one is tempted to define foundation in terms of weak foun-
dation by saying that an object is founded upon another object when it is
weakly founded upon it, and the second is not a part of the first. Now it is hard
to see how weak foundation could be defined in the spirit of Husserl’s analy-
sis of foundation. As I will argue now, such a Husserlian approach to weak
foundation cannot be found, and I shall subsequently propose an alternative
approach to both weak foundation and foundation.
It is perhaps tempting to propose the following disjunctive analysis of weak
foundation: an object is weakly founded upon another iff either the first is
founded upon the second, or the second is part of the first. But such a proposal
cannot be sustained.
First of all, the definition, though perhaps extensionally correct, goes
against the idea mentioned above according to which foundation is to be de-
fined in terms of the weak notion.
Secondly, one may argue that the proposed definition is even not exten-
sionally correct. For, one might say, every creature is founded upon God in the
weak sense we wish to characterize. But, one will go on, no creature is a part
of God, and moreover, it is not true that God and, say, I, are connected within
a more comprehensive whole. Of course, one may object to this argument, say-
ing e.g. that all creatures are part of God, or that in virtue of the principle of
unrestricted composition, God and I actually have a sum. But the correctness
of an analysis of weak foundation should not turn on the truth-value of par-
ticular ontological theses such as the thesis that God contains everything he
created, and the principle of unrestricted composition.
Finally, one may object to the proposal that weak foundation is not a mere-
ological notion, in the sense that the notion involves no mereological concept.
If the proposed definition is not correct, then what else can be put in its place?
The above proposal concerned a notion of objectual weak foundation. At the
level of species, Husserl mentions a certain relation which, one might think, is
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close to what we are looking for. The relation is defined in section 21 as follows:
A content of the species A is founded upon a content of the species B, if an A can by
its essence (i.e. legally, in virtue of its specific nature) not exist, unless a B also exists.
Husserl actually seems to take this to be an alternative, equivalent characteri-
zation of the relation of species foundation he characterized in section 14. As
Simons emphasizes, Husserl is certainly mistaken in this respect (p. 123). Any-
way, it should be clear that the notion Husserl defines in the quoted passage
is far from providing us with what we want. For it seems to be impossible to
define objectual weak foundation in terms of the specific notion in more or
less the way proposed by Husserl: the problems we encountered with Husserl’s
original notion of foundation are still present here, and the kind of solution I
proposed is unavailable in the present case.
Thus, I take it that there is no Husserlian approach to weak foundation. In
the rest of the paper, I wish to present a sketch of an alternative approach to
foundation which I find appealing. The approach takes weak foundation as the
basic concept.
Let us start with a notion we shall call for the moment grounding. An ob-
ject is grounded in another object iff (part of) what makes the first exist is that
the second exists. Thus, one might want to say, sets are grounded in their ele-
ments, concrete wholes in their parts, Aristotelian universals in their exempli-
fiers, or again tropes in their bearers. Grounding is obviously not a mereolog-
ical notion. And a grounded object is in an obvious sense ontologically
non-self-sufficient: it cannot exist without its grounds, or without objects of
certain kinds its grounds belong to.
We then identify (objectual) weak foundation with grounding, and we de-
fine foundation in terms of grounding (expressed by ‘G’) in the way suggested
above, saying that an object is founded upon another object when the first is
grounded in the second and the second is not part of the first:
x y ≡ xGy ∧ ¬ x ≤ y.
Under this approach, species foundation is naturally defined in terms of ob-
jectual foundation as follows:
A  M ≡  A∀x (xεA ⊃ ∃y (yεM ∧ x y))
i.e.: A is founded upon M iff it is part of what it is to be an A that every A is
founded upon some M.
It is interesting to note that within the present approach, Husserl’s six the-
orems follow from fairly weak assumptions. Proposition 2 follows from our
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definition of foundation, the transitivity of parthood, and two intuitively cor-
rect principles about grounding, namely (i) that grounding is transitive, and
(ii) that wholes are grounded in their parts. Thus, using definitions (D4)–(D8),
we have all the theorems 3–6, as well as theorem 2 under the objectual read-
ing. In order to get theorem 1 and theorem 2 under the generic reading, it suf-
fices to put:
x  M ≡ ∃A (xεA ∧ A M).
In fact, no extra assumption is then needed.
All this is only a rough sketch of an approach to foundation, for obviously
more should be said on the topic. I will not go further here, but hope to do it
elsewhere.10
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